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Abstract
This article explains variation in the role of the Council Secretariat in first and second pillar policy-
making. While the Council Secretariat started in both pillars as a facilitator of decision-making, it 
has  been  delegated  additional  tasks  in  foreign  policy:  from  providing  content  expertise  to 
representation. Such functions would normally have gone to the European Commission, yet in the 
sensitive domain of foreign policy the member states have preferred their own secretariat. This has 
implications  in  terms  of  agency.  Due to  its  additional  tasks,  the  Council  Secretariat  has  more 
bureaucratic resources in the second pillar. While its activities furthermore used to be restricted to 
the decision-making phase, it is now also playing a role in the agenda-shaping and implementation 
of  European foreign  policy.  These  additional  bureaucratic  resources  and opportunities  not  only 
impact on the Council Secretariat's political influence in the second pillar, but also on its strategies 
to promote its preferences.
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INTRODUCTION
It took scholars fifty years before they dedicated a full article to the role of the Council Secretariat 
in  European  Union  (EU)  policy-making;  and  despite  some  recent  attention  (Beach  2004; 
Christiansen 2002; Christiansen and Vanhoonacker 2008; Dijkstra 2008) the work of its 3400-plus 
civil servants remains underexplored.1 It sometimes seems that this is exactly the intention of the 
Council  Secretariat,  which  tries  to  protect  its  impartiality  by  deliberately  staying  outside  the 
limelight.  Instead of putting itself  to  the  fore,  it  has preferred to  be the  éminence grise to  the 
Presidency in the first  pillar  and to  leave  the talking  to  the  country in  the  chair.  The Council  
Secretariat in the second pillar is, however, not gun shy. Since the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), it has  
been the home of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
Javier  Solana as well  as  his  senior  officials  have been rather  outspoken.  Apart  from making a 
contribution to the public debate, officials from the Council Secretariat also actively take the floor 
in the Council.
1 The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, as it is formally called, was founded in 1952. The 
staff figure is from the 2009 EU General Budget.
This article tries to explain the variation in the roles of the Council Secretariat across both 
pillars. In line with rational choice institutionalist accounts of European integration, it argues that 
there are multiple reasons for the delegation of tasks to  supranational institutions.  The Council 
Secretariat, in this respect, started in both pillars from the same basis: to reduce the negotiation 
costs of co-operation. Yet as the CFSP grew more complex during the 1990s, the member states 
delegated  additional tasks to the Council Secretariat, ranging from content expertise to collective 
representation.  In  the  first  pillar  such  functions  would  normally  have  gone  to  the  European 
Commission, but in the sensitive domain of foreign policy the sovereignty-wary member states 
preferred  their  own  secretariat  over  the  resource-rich  and  formally  autonomous  Commission.
That the Council Secretariat has been delegated additional tasks in the CFSP has obvious 
implications in  terms of  agency.  With regard to  bureaucratic  resources,  it  previously possessed 
considerable  ‘process  expertise’ in  both  pillars,  but  now  it  also  has  acquired  some  ‘content 
expertise’ in the field of the CFSP.  While its activities furthermore used to be restricted to the 
decision-making phase, due to its new responsibilities the Council Secretariat is now playing a role 
in the agenda-shaping and implementation of foreign policy as well. These additional bureaucratic 
resources  and  opportunities  in  the  CFSP improve  the  possibilities  for  the  Secretariat  to  assert 
political  influence.  This  article  will  first  provide  a  theoretical  overview and  will  subsequently 
discuss the role of the Council Secretariat in both pillars empirically.
DELEGATION, BUREAUCRATIC RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Rationale for delegation
When analysing the bureaucratic resources of an agent, it is important to identify the initial rationale  
behind the delegation. Since rational choice institutionalists see the delegation of tasks to an agent 
in terms of functional needs based upon a careful cost–benefit analysis (e.g., Keohane 1984; Pollack 
1997; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002), these reasons are critical as they determine to a large extent 
the institutional setting, in which the agent operates, and the bureaucratic resources it has at its  
disposal. Agents are created to carry out particular tasks – because they can do it better or cheaper 
than the principals – and they are designed to do their job. After identifying the initial rationale for 
delegation,  more  precise  hypotheses  can  be  formulated  concerning  the  institutional  design  and 
potential political influence of the agent (Pollack 1997, 2003). While there are all sorts of good 
reasons for principals to delegate tasks, in the study of the EU institutions the emphasis has been on 
the member states trying to reduce their transaction costs of co-operation. These transaction costs 
vary in the different phases of the policy cycle.
During  the  agenda-setting  phase  there  is  the  risk  of  cycling  and  overcrowded  or 
underdeveloped agendas (Tallberg 2006). This problem can be dealt with by delegating the right of 
initiative to supranational institutions or a chairmanship.  The decision-making phase in the EU 
furthermore entails a large number of negotiations taking place on a daily basis with thousands of 
diplomats  from  different  national  ministries,  requiring  office  management,  translation  and 
distribution  of  documents,  as  well  as  co-ordination,  leadership  and  brokerage.  Supranational 
institutions  can  play  an  important  role  here  due  to  their  permanent  presence,  continuity  and 
institutional memory. In addition,  the member states face information costs during the decision-
making phase depending on the complexity of the policy area. Epstein and O'Halloran (1999) have 
shown that there is  a  need for information in  agriculture,  finance  and environment,  as well  as 
security  and defence  policies.  Supranational  expert  bureaucracies  can  reduce  these  costs,  since 
having a centralized bureaucracy is generally cheaper than 27 bureaucracies across the member 
states. Another advantage is that supranational expert bureaucracies can provide relatively unbiased 
information (Abbott and Snidal 1998). A commonly agreed information base is especially important 
for efficient decision-making in divisive policy areas.
The implementation phase has been mostly studied in the context of delegation. The credible 
commitment  problem,  in  particular,  stands  out.  After  an  agreement  has  been  reached,  proper 
implementation or domestic compliance is, after all, not guaranteed. Supranational institutions can 
help to reduce these costs by being a neutral monitor and enforcer of the treaties (Pollack 1997, 
2003).  In  a  bounded  rational  world,  every  complex  agreement  is  furthermore  incomplete 
(Williamson 1985). The member states cannot lay down all the details in the treaties or secondary  
legislation, which can eventually lead to non-compliance, if some member states block the process 
at  a later stage.  Moravcsik (1998) has shown that  member states,  in order to enhance credible  
commitments,  therefore  either  pool  or  delegate  some  of  their  sovereignty  to  structure  future 
incentives. The delegation of executive tasks to the Commission in the field of competition policy is 
an  example.  As  compliance  problems  and  incomplete  contracting  take  place  in  a  divisive 
distributive environment, there is the need to formalize these credible commitments and to give 
supranational institutions significant autonomy (Tallberg 2000, 2002).
Delegating tasks to a supranational  implementing executive not only takes place for the 
purpose  of  credible  commitments,  but  can  also  result  from an  efficiency  effort  to  relieve  the 
member  states  from  over-involvement  in  the  details  (Majone  2001).  Contrary  to  the  credible 
commitment problem, the member states are more likely to create such an efficient implementing 
executive when issues are relatively non-divisive. As a result these implementing executives are 
unlikely to hold significant autonomy (Majone 2001). Similarly to much of the delegation in the 
agenda-setting and decision-making phase, these institutions only facilitate the member states in 
their daily work and as such provide efficiency gains for all. Finally there is a demand for collective 
representation,  as  EU  negotiations  often  have  an  impact  on  agreements  with  external  actors 
(Tallberg  2006).  Representation  through  ‘one  voice’ –  either  a  chairmanship  or  supranational 
institution – is generally more efficient than member states going at it individually.
Since the policies of the EU are diverse,  there is  a  variation in the functional  needs of 
member  states  across  the  pillars.  Because  foreign  policy  co-ordination  is  generally  a  reactive 
exercise, agenda-setting powers are of less importance in the second than in the first pillar. The 
CFSP agenda is therefore likely to be structured through informal management arrangements than 
via formal rules. The negotiation costs of decision-making are, on the contrary, relevant in both 
pillars: in the first pillar due to the amount of negotiations; in the second pillar as a result of its 
high-velocity character. Informational input is required in various first pillar areas and in foreign 
policy as well.  Credible commitments, on the other hand, are not a major concern in the CFSP. 
Because member states have chosen a particular institutional structure in the second pillar – the co-
ordination of foreign policies over, for example, a federalization – non-compliance is not an issue 
(Wagner 2003). The sovereignty-wary member states have furthermore decided not to address the 
issue of incomplete contracting in the CFSP, but rather to co-ordinate again when necessary. With 
the arrival of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, 1999), the need for an efficient 
implementing bureaucracy has become as pertinent in the CFSP as it is in the first pillar. Finally, 
both pillars require external representation.
Given  such  variation  in  functional  needs  in  both  pillars,  it  is  interesting  to  look  at  the 
division of labour between the Commission and the Council Secretariat – the two ‘supranational 
executives’. This article will empirically show below that the Council Secretariat was created in the 
first  pillar  to  reduce  the  negotiation  costs of  co-operation.  Agenda-setting,  informational  input, 
credible commitments and representation went to the Commission (and its agencies and the Court 
of Justice). In the second pillar, the Council Secretariat reduces the negotiation costs of co-operation  
as well. Yet, for other functional demands, the member states have divided tasks differently. Because 
credible commitments were not a major concern, the member states could comfortably keep the 
resource-rich and formally autonomous Commission at arm's length. As European foreign policy 
grew more complex, they therefore delegated informational tasks instead to the Council Secretariat.  
Executive implementing functions in the CFSP were mostly given to the Council Secretariat. The 
tasks  of  informal  agenda-setting  and  collective  representation  were  initially  delegated  to  the 
Presidency,  but  later  also  to  the  Council  Secretariat.  The  Commission  has  a  shared  right  of 
initiative. Table 1 gives an overview of these functions.
Table 1 Delegation to the Commission and Council Secretariat
Phase Functional demand First pillar Second pillar
Agenda-setting Stable agenda Commission Commission / Secretariat*
Decision-making Efficient process
Information / expertise
Secretariat
Commission
Secretariat
Secretariat
Implementation Credible commitments
Efficient executive
Collective representation
Commission
Commission
Commission
Secretariat*
Secretariat*
* The Council Secretariat performs these tasks under formal guidance of the Presidency and Council. 
Bureaucratic resources of EU institutions
Because institutions are designed to do their job, their bureaucratic resources closely relate to the 
rationale  for  delegation.  Resources  consist,  firstly,  of  formal  competences.  Yet,  as  the  Council 
Secretariat was not created for the purpose of credible commitments, its formal competences are 
limited. In addition, bureaucratic resources consist of informational surpluses. Typically bureaucrats 
are better in assessing their own diligence when dealing with a delegated task than their political 
principals  (Arrow  1985).  Supranational  civil  servants  with  an  informational  advantage  can 
furthermore help member states to reach additional gains – if negotiations are not Pareto-efficient – 
by taking on an advisory role and meanwhile pursuing a distribution closer to their private interests. 
The question is thus what these informational asymmetries are and how they relate to the rationale 
for delegation.
Civil  servants  in  supranational  institutions,  which  mitigate  negotiation  costs,  normally 
accumulate ‘process expertise’ (e.g., political, negotiation, procedural) over time and information on  
the state-of-play of negotiations (Beach 2005; Metcalfe 1998; Tallberg 2006). Due to their longer-
term involvement, continuity and institutional memory, they have a good overview of the historical 
preferences  of  member  states.  Because  they  are  at  the  core  of  the  machinery,  through  their 
interaction with the Presidency and the (confidential) bilateral contacts with key member states, 
they know precisely at what stage a proposal is during the negotiation process. As ‘guardians of the 
orthodoxy’ they also have the authority and reputation to point the member states at how to make 
best use of the rules of the game. While these civil servants do not have a monopoly on negotiation 
skills, they thus have structural advantages over the Presidency and the member states.
Civil servants in expert bureaucracies, who provide the member states with information, do 
not  hold  these  informational  advantages.  Rather,  they  post  their  policy  recommendations  at 
particular moments in time and thus do not have much process expertise or information on the state-
of-play.  Rather,  they  have  ‘content  expertise’ (e.g.,  policy,  technical,  legal).  Since  outsourcing 
implies that one no longer performs the tasks ‘in-house’, the administrative capacity of the member 
states is normally reduced out of efficiency considerations. The notion of expert bureaucracies has 
recently  been  under  pressure  in  some  rationalist  theories.  The  numbers  of  supranational  civil 
servants in Brussels, it is argued, tend to be smaller than in the capitals (e.g., Pollack 2003). Apart  
from  the  fact  that  this  observation  is  sometimes  incorrect  (see  below),  and  that  numbers  in 
themselves do not always mean much, it is clear that officials in the Commission generally know 
more  about  the  collective  legislation  of  all  the  member  states  than  experts  of  the  individual  
countries.
Opportunities in the policy cycle
Supranational institutions will only be tempted to use their informational asymmetry in case  of a 
goal conflict with the member states. While Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991: 5) confidently assume 
that ‘there is almost always some conflict between the interests of those who delegate authority 
(principals) and the agents to whom they delegate it’, it seems nonetheless a good idea to identify 
what the Council Secretariat really wants. It is, in this respect, possible to differentiate analytically 
between competence-maximizing (Majone 1996) and policy-seeking interests. These preferences 
are often complementary (pro-environment policy leads to more competences for the Directorate-
General  for  Environment),  but  there  can  also  be  a  trade-off.  For  a  supranational  institution  to  
perform  brokerage  to  overcome  a  stalemate  in  the  negotiations  requires  a  relatively  neutral 
reputation. Yet, the active promotion of policy preferences endangers such reputation. It is therefore 
likely that the Council Secretariat in the first pillar, which is only to a limited extent engaged with  
the  substance  of  policy,  will  focus  on  its  competence-maximizing  preferences.  The  Council 
Secretariat in the second pillar is more extensively engaged with the substance and will thus have to 
balance between its interests.
While the incentive to pursue private interests is thus almost always present, it  is also a 
question  of  whether  opportunities  actually  arise.  In  the  implementation  of  delegated  tasks,  the 
agent's  discretion  correlates  with  the  informational  asymmetries  and  the  control  mechanisms 
(Arrow  1985).  With  regard  to  actual  decision-making,  informational  asymmetries  do  not 
automatically transform into political influence; the supranational civil servants also require access 
to  the  political  power-holders  in  order  to  convince  them.  Whether  the  member  states  actually 
delegate tasks for implementation to the civil servants in the Council Secretariat and whether civil 
servants  are  being  granted  access  very  much  depends  in  a  repeated  game  on  reputation. 
Furthermore,  while the Council  Secretariat  in the first  pillar is  only active during the decision-
making phase of the policy cycle, as a result of its delegated tasks, there are also opportunities for 
the Council Secretariat  during the agenda-setting and implementation of foreign policy (putting 
initiatives forward and making them happen).
Table 2 Expected bureaucratic resources, goal conflicts and opportunities in the policy cycle of the Council 
Secretariat.
First pillar Second pillar
Bureaucratic resources 
Process expertise
Content expertise
State of play
X
X
X
X
X
Preferences and interests
Competences
Policy-seeking
X X
X
Opportunity in the policy cycle
Agenda-setting
Decision-making
Implementation
X
X
X
X
Whether supranational institutions can exercise political influence lastly depends on the availability 
of  control  mechanisms.  If  effective  monitoring  prevents  the  agent  from  shirking,  its  political  
influence in the end is minimal. While the principal–agent literature is full of examples of control 
mechanisms  to  limit  agency  during  policy  implementation  (e.g.,  McCubbins  et  al. 1987; 
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), it is more complicated when the agent takes on an advisory role. 
Obviously, the principal can disregard the advice in case of lack of trust, but objectively evaluating 
the information is difficult.  Furthermore,  within EU bureaucracy punishing the agent  ex post is 
often hardly possible, because the principals tend to disagree. If control mechanisms are identified, 
they are likely to be ex ante and deal with incentives to prevent goal conflicts in the first place.
COUNCIL SECRETARIAT IN THE FIRST PILLAR
The remainder of this article will discuss the empirical evidence. It analyses the first and second 
pillars separately. However, before going to the institutional structures in these pillars, it is useful to 
point at the limited formal competences of the Council Secretariat in the Treaties (see Table 3).
Table 3 The Council Secretariat in the Treaties (adjusted by the author)
First pillar: article 207(2) Treaty establishing the European Community
o The Council shall be assisted by a General Secretariat … The Council shall decide on the organisation of 
the General Secretariat.
Second pillar: articles 18(3), 26 Treaty on European Union
o The Presidency shall be assisted by the … High Representative.
o The High Representative … shall assist the Council … within the scope of the [CFSP], in particular 
through:
- Contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions; 
- Acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency.
Rationale for delegation
The Council Secretariat was created in 1952 ‘to assist the Council’ (Rules of Procedure 1952, article  
11) and its ‘initial  staffing levels [were to] be kept to the minimum number strictly necessary’ 
(Council  1952,  article  V),  which  points  in  the  direction  of  a  cost–benefit  analysis.  For  the 
organization of the Secretariat, the models of the Benelux and League of Nations secretariats were 
considered (Memorandum to the Secretary, September 1952), but this was not deemed adequate for 
the needs of the member states. By furthermore remaining in charge of the organization of the 
Secretariat (Rules of Procedure 1952, article 12), the Council had strict control over bureaucratic 
expansion.  The  Council  Secretariat  was  thus  intentionally  designed.  In  contrast  to  the  High 
Authority  and the  Court  of Justice (Pollack 2003),  the Secretariat  was not  created for  credible 
commitments. It was supportive.
The Council Secretariat has come a long way since the early days of European integration. 
Its  staff  has increased from the initial  30 to  over 3,000 officials  (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 
2006). Over time it took on new roles, such as an ‘honest broker’ in the negotiations among member 
states,  particularly  after  the  ‘empty  chair’  crisis  (1966)  had  compromised  the  Commission's 
impartiality.  Through its  continuity and institutional  memory,  it  also  became the  chief  political 
advisor to the Presidency (Westlake and Galloway 2004). And yet, despite all these new roles, it is 
surprising that while the Rules of Procedures have become much more detailed over the decades, 
the articles on the Council Secretariat have remained more or less the same.
The Council Secretariat's main responsibility in the first pillar has remained ‘to create the 
conditions for a smooth running of the Council machinery’ (Christiansen and Vanhoonacker 2008: 
756; see also Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006; Westlake and Galloway 2004). The new roles and 
the increase in personnel reflected the increasing complexity of the European Union and the need of 
the  member  states for  efficient  decision-making.  The important  learning effect  for  the  member 
states, and particularly for the Presidencies, has been that involving the Council Secretariat leads to 
higher efficiency gains and to lower negotiation costs.
Bureaucratic resources
The Council Secretariat's relevance in the first pillar can probably be best put in numbers. Among 
its  tasks  is  the  organization  of  the  Council's  work.  This  includes  the  ‘producing,  translating, 
distributing and archiving’ annually of almost 100,000 documents and 100 million copies (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 113). To guarantee efficiency, the Council Secretariat has formalized 
its  procedures  for  circulating  the  agenda,  documents  and  silence  procedures.  Furthermore,  the 
vertical  and horizontal  co-ordination in  the Council  gives  the  Secretariat  a  key  position in  the 
decision-making web. Only its minutes are official and on the basis of these minutes the Council 
Secretariat  writes  the  cover  notes,  outlining  the  major  discussions,  which  accompany  draft 
legislation across the Council and European institutions.
To provide more evidence of what these tasks mean in terms of the Council Secretariat's 
bureaucratic  resources,  it  is  interesting to  point  at  the  Report  of  the  ‘Three  Wise  Men’ on the 
European Institutions. Already, in 1979, they concluded that the Council Secretariat ‘possesses a 
knowledge  of  procedures,  an  overall  view  of  the  machinery,  and  an  opportunity  for  neutral 
assessment  of  the  other  States’ attitudes  which  even the  largest  national  administration  cannot 
match'  (Committee  of  Three  of  the  European  Council  1979:  34).  Given  the  above-mentioned 
increase in personnel, this statement is even more relevant today. Over time the Council Secretariat 
has accumulated process expertise  due to  its  continuity vis-à-vis the  rotating diplomats and its 
institutional memory. As a result of its key position in the co-ordination of EU decision-making, it  
has an excellent overview of the state-of-play.
Since the Council Secretariat has so much process expertise, it seems a natural ally for the 
Presidency. But this has come with a cost. In addition to its traditional roles (logistics provider, 
record keeper, and purveyor of legal advice), the Secretariat has furthered its bureaucratic interests 
– often at the expense of the Presidency – by taking on the previously mentioned new roles (e.g., 
Christiansen  2002;  Christiansen  and  Vanhoonacker  2008;  Hayes-Renshaw  and  Wallace  2006; 
Westlake and Galloway 2004). It is exactly these roles, carried out by officials at diplomatic level, 
which have recently provided the Council Secretariat with more process expertise, knowledge about 
the state-of-play and possible informational asymmetries. The dependency of member states has 
thus increased.
While  a  number  of  these  new  tasks  are  important  and  while  the  process  expertise  is 
significant, it must also be emphasized that the Council Secretariat's expertise in the first pillar is 
not exclusive. Diplomats know how to run negotiations and to co-ordinate between different levels 
as well. Moreover, much depends on the preparation of the Presidency and its willingness to get the  
Council Secretariat involved. Lastly, some observers (e.g., Tallberg 2006) have noted that officials 
from Council Secretariat also gain content expertise while working on a dossier. Although this is 
probably true, such content expertise is very limited compared to the expertise of the Commission 
in the first pillar. Leadership based on content expertise alone is thus unlikely to come from the 
Council Secretariat, but it can strengthen its position versus the Presidency.
Opportunities in the policy cycle
At the surface the Council Secretariat presents itself as an impartial actor. As a senior official once 
put it, ‘I don't mind whether [the member states] decide to paint the room black or white, as long as 
the decision is taken in the correct way’ (quoted in Schout and Vanhoonacker 2006: 1054). While 
staying neutral might not be the Council Secretariat's default value, it is clear that it attaches less 
importance to its substantive preferences than to competence-maximizing. Maintaining an impartial 
reputation is its strategy to acquire the ‘more important’ roles it cherishes (i.e., being an ‘honest 
broker’;  providing  political  advice;  a  ‘good offices’ mediator).  The  profile  of  the  competence-
maximizer  is  empirically  supported  by  Christiansen  (2006)  and  Beach  (2004,  2007).  The 
relationship  with  the  Presidency  also  needs  to  be  mentioned.  While  this  is  often  its  de  facto 
principal  (Beach  2007),  its  formal  principals  are  the  member  states.  Former  Secretary-General 
Ersbøll (1992), in this respect, stated that ‘our master is the Council … we have ways of acting as a 
brake on national Presidency initiatives if ever they should take on an excessive national colouring’ 
(quoted  in  Westlake  and  Galloway  2004:  350).  This  obviously  helps  the  Council  Secretariat's 
reputation as an honest broker.
The windows of opportunities for the Council Secretariat in the first pillar to use its process 
expertise  in order to  further private  interests  are  restricted to  the decision-making phase of the 
policy cycle. Once the Commission – having the exclusive right of initiative – has tabled a proposal,  
the Secretariat gets involved. After legislation has been adopted, it is up to the Commission and the 
member  states  to  implement  it.  Only  when cases  are  referred to  the  Court  of Justice  does  the  
Council Secretariat's legal service have an important presence in terms of representing the Council. 
Given its general pro-Council preferences, as well as the aim for legal purity, no agency costs are 
involved for the member states during this stage.
In  the  decision-making  phase,  however,  the  Council  Secretariat  is  involved  from  the 
beginning to the very end. After the Commission has tabled its draft, the Secretariat provides the 
Presidency with political advice on which strategies to take using its institutional memory with 
regard to  previous national  preferences. Following the deliberations of the working groups, the 
Council  Secretariat  sends  a  ‘note  to  working party  members’ accompanying  the  redrafted  text 
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). This note includes the major positions of the member states on 
the  outstanding  paragraphs.  When  the  draft  moves  up  to  the  Committee  of  Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER), the Council Secretariat writes a similar cover note ‘to COREPER 
from the working party’ and a strategic confidential document ‘to the chair of COREPER from the 
Secretariat’,  which  may  include  speaking  notes  (Hayes-Renshaw  and  Wallace  2006).  These 
documents contain phrases such as ‘“the Poles are isolated” … “a possible vote has been signalled”’  
(Nugent 2006: 203). The same procedure applies when the draft moves up to Council. Through this 
system of notes, any Presidency becomes dependent on the Council Secretariat and such access is 
helpful when maximizing its competences.
Since few dossiers in the first pillar are concluded under the leadership of one Presidency, 
the Council Secretariat also has a role to play through briefing the incoming Presidency (Nugent 
2006). As the officials of the Secretariat have been so closely involved in the process, incoming 
Presidencies  often  rely  on  its  information  regarding  the  state-of-play  of  the  negotiations.  The 
Council Secretariat has been active as well, as stated above, in slowing down the pet projects of 
Presidencies, by pointing them at the long agenda of unfinished and ongoing work. Fully stopping 
ambitious  Presidencies  is  obviously  not  in  its  powers.  The  Council  Secretariat's  influence  will  
always be limited to the extent that the Presidency allows it to play a role.
Apart from providing strategic advice to the country in the chair, the Council Secretariat also 
takes a proactive, though behind-the-scenes, approach in the negotiations. The Council Secretariat 
is particularly important when negotiations get very difficult during the end-game. Together with 
the Presidency it often plays the role of an ‘honest broker’ due to its perceived neutrality. In most  
cases  it  is  the  Secretariat  rather  than  the  Presidency  which  comes  up  with  the  compromise 
(Sherrington 2000: 166). Commission officials clearly prefer such a Brussels-drafted rather than 
capital-drafted compromise, because apart from the Presidency's private interests, quickly finalizing 
a draft before the end of the Presidency often leads to lowest common denominator agreements 
(interview Commission official, 2008). It goes without saying that the ‘power of the pen’ increases 
the dependence of member states on the Council Secretariat.
While  the  intense  involvement  of  the  Council  Secretariat  in  the  decision-making  phase 
creates room to increase its own role and informal competences, it is still up to the member states to 
decide to what extent they rely on the Council  Secretariat.  This seems to be the major control 
mechanism. Some Presidencies have been more reluctant than others to use the Secretariat (e.g., 
Christiansen  2002;  Elgström  2003;  Schout  and  van  Vanhoonacker  2006).  Its  opportunity  to 
maximize its role thus varies depending on its access to the formal power holders. While many 
national representatives in COREPER are aware of the added value of the Secretariat, ministers in 
the national capitals sometimes prefer to rely on their personal advisers (Nugent 2006).
COUNCIL SECRETARIAT IN THE SECOND PILLAR
Rationale for delegation
The  sensitivities  of  foreign  policy  can hardly  be  overstated  when discussing  delegation  in  the 
second pillar.  Not only have the member states kept  the Commission at  arm's length since the 
initiation of foreign policy co-operation (1970), they also originally preferred to keep the secretarial 
tasks ‘in-house’ by delegating them to the Presidency (Nuttall 1992). Three years after the start of 
foreign policy co-operation, the member states nonetheless noted that ‘experience has also shown 
that the Presidency's task presents a particularly heavy administrative burden’ (Copenhagen Report 
1973: article 8); yet they did little to reduce it. The delegation costs were apparently higher. Only 
with  the  Single  European  Act  (1987),  a  small-scale  Brussels-based  Secretariat  was  finally 
established to  ‘assist  the Presidency’ with administrative  functions  (article  30(10)(g)).  With  the 
Maastricht Treaty,  this Secretariat was strengthened and integrated in the Council Secretariat.  It 
became known as the ‘CFSP unit’.
When, during the 1990s, the Commission was not forthcoming with policy proposals under 
its newly gained shared right of initiative, the Presidency increasingly started to look at the Council 
Secretariat for content expertise (Dijkstra 2009). In a reaction to the Bosnian and Kosovo wars, the 
member states further strengthened the Council Secretariat under the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) with 
the High Representative and the Policy Unit in Brussels and with EU Special Representatives on the  
ground. This was meant to make the CFSP ‘more effective, coherent, and visible’ (Vanhoonacker 
1997: 7). According to the report by the Reflection Group (1995), which prepared the Treaty, the 
Policy Unit could ensure, during the ‘preparatory phase’ of policy-making, ‘the necessary follow-up 
to crisis situations’ and prepare ‘possible response and decision options’. In the final Treaty, one of 
the  Policy  Unit's  tasks  is  to  produce  ‘argued  policy  options  papers’ (Declaration  annexed  to 
Amsterdam Treaty). The Special Representatives represent the European Union on the ground and 
report to the High Representative. The member states were thus filling the gap left by the relative 
absence of the Commission in the CFSP (Dijkstra 2008).
As a result of the Helsinki and Nice European Councils (1999, 2000), which created ESDP, 
the Council Secretariat also became the European Union's source of military expertise through the 
establishment of the EU Military Staff (EUMS). This body currently employs 200-plus military 
officers. It does not act as a fully fledged implementing executive, but rather supports the member 
states in day-to-day ESDP decisions. When the EU is not engaged, it provides early warning and 
monitors potential crises. In crisis management situations, it handles intelligence, provides situation 
assessment  and military  strategic  options  to  the  member  states,  and co-ordinates  with  national 
planning staffs that might participate in EU-led operations. During the operations themselves, the 
EUMS assists the Operation and Force Commanders. Since 2007, the Council Secretariat is also the 
basis of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which performs similar functions in 
civilian crisis management. For intelligence-sharing, it has a Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN).
Bureaucratic resources
The Council Secretariat has accumulated process expertise in the CFSP in a similar fashion as in the 
first pillar. Because it initially did not have a long foreign policy tradition and since second pillar 
dossiers differ substantially from those of the first pillar, this has taken some time. On the other  
hand,  the  Council  Secretariat  has  been  at  the  forefront  of  developing  the  crisis  management 
procedures in ESDP. This has led to significant process expertise. Acquiring strategic information 
on the state-of-play is similar to the first pillar as well. Yet, due to the relatively weak role of the 
Commission, the Council Secretariat and the Presidency have an even more powerful position in the  
second pillar  (Duke and Vanhoonacker  2006).  Importantly,  the Council  Secretariat  already gets 
involved during the agenda-setting phase and has an important role to play in implementation (see 
below). This gives it an even better overview of the state-of-play.
The  relative  absence  of  the  Commission  in  the  second  pillar  also  has  an  effect  on  the 
Council  Secretariat's  content  expertise.  As  described  above,  the  civil  servants  of  the  Council 
Secretariat have become the Presidency's major source of policy expertise in Brussels. On a daily 
basis the Presidency draws on the expertise of more than 150 civil servants in the Directorate-
General for External Relations (DG E). Solana furthermore receives direct input from the Policy 
Unit – nowadays almost integrated in DG E – consisting of 30-plus seconded national officials. 
Particularly in the very political areas, where the presence of the Commission has traditionally been 
weak or non-existent, the Council Secretariat has strong content expertise. As far as information-
gathering is concerned, the Council Secretariat is still heavily dependent on the input of the member 
states,  apart  from  the  regular  fact  finding  missions  and  briefings  from  the  EU  Special  
Representatives. It does not have a permanent external or intelligence service.
The  Council  Secretariat's  military  expertise  in  the  ESDP furthermore  deserves  special 
attention. Apart from the creation of the EUMS, CPCC and SITCEN, the Secretariat became the 
basis of two substantial directorates, dealing with civilian and military affairs. In total it currently 
employs  over  400  officials,  who  support  the  member  states  during  the  decision-making  and 
implementation for ESDP operations. In terms of numbers,  there are no member states with so 
much specific policy expertise. With the creation of the independent Operation Centre (2007) within 
the EUMS, the Council Secretariat might furthermore in the future be in charge of carrying out the 
complete  implementation of  ESDP operations.  These services  were explicitly  created  as  expert 
bureaucracies and they are functioning as such. They provide the member states with most of the 
relevant military information during the decision-making phase and support the member states with 
information when actually implementing ESDP missions.
Opportunities in the policy cycle
That the competence-related interests of the Council Secretariat in the second pillar can lead to goal 
conflicts has become obvious during various conflicts with the Commission and several member 
states (Crowe 2003; Dijkstra 2009; Spence 2006). In filling the above-mentioned informational gap, 
the Council Secretariat quite naturally met the Commission on its way. The Council Secretariat's 
preferences in the second pillar, however, go beyond competence-maximizing. Various examples 
are the repeated pleas by Solana to build up stronger military capabilities and well as the notion of 
‘pre-emptive action’ promoted by Robert Cooper, the Director-General for External Relations. Such 
interest in military capabilities is in conflict with the preferences of a number of member states. 
This became evident during the negotiations on the European Security Strategy (2003), where the 
member states watered down the initial proposals.
Quite clearly, there is much overlap between these competence and substantive preferences. 
More emphasis on military resources (rather than civilian power) implies a more central role for the 
Council Secretariat in foreign policy-making. Yet, the fact that Solana and his civil servants express 
their opinions on the role, the scope and the identity of the European Union in the world, as well as  
on the future road to be taken, and actively promote these preferences distinguishes the Council 
Secretariat's foreign policy services from those of the first pillar. It is, for example, hard to imagine 
civil  servants  in  the  first  pillar  trying  to  promote  a  more  social  or  liberal  Europe.  These  are 
generally not the preferences on which first pillar civil servants are acting.
The scope for opportunities to gain private interest is also larger in the second than in the 
first  pillar.  In  the  CFSP  the  Council  Secretariat  is  involved  in  setting  the  agenda  and  in 
implementing agreed policy under the guidance of the Presidency. In the agenda-setting phase, the 
political  profile  of  the  High Representative  is  crucial.  By simply  visiting  countries  or  regions,  
Solana can turn the eye of world media at particular issues he deems important. It was telling, for 
example, that Solana was the first governmental leader to visit the Middle East after conflicts broke 
out in Lebanon (2006). He furthermore ensured that the issue did not leave the European agenda 
and persuaded major European countries, such as Italy and France, to make up the backbone of the 
United Nations peacekeeping operation. Similarly he played an active role during the conflict in 
Macedonia (2001).
In the decision-making phase, it is the Council Secretariat, which drafts most of the common 
positions in the CFSP. These documents range from simple statements to complicated joint actions 
and operational plans for military missions. The member states obviously decide, but writing the 
drafts matters. It is worth noting that during the political decision-making phase, national diplomats 
often have too little military expertise. That is why they rely heavily on the EUMS, which was 
conceived as the main military planning body. The EUMS thus moves up the policy cycle and the  
Council Secretariat can apply its informational asymmetry when it comes to decide on matters of a 
political nature. It is furthermore important to note that time pressures in the CFSP are particularly 
high. The civilian observation mission in Georgia (2008) was, for example, planned in five days 
after the formal agenda-setting. Such time pressures limit the information processing capabilities of 
the national diplomats.
During  the  implementation  phase,  the  Council  Secretariat  plays  a  role  along  with  the 
Presidency and the member states. Following the Treaties, the High Representative can be asked to 
represent the European Union. In these cases the Council Secretariat can exercise hidden action. In 
addition,  the  Council  Secretariat  acts  as  the  liaison  between  the  chain  of  command  of  ESDP 
missions and the member states. This is important during the detailed planning of an operation, its 
force  generation,  launch and the  actual  implementation.  Its  actions  are  ex  post  supervised  and 
approved by the Political and Security Committee, a member states' body in the Council.
CONCLUSION
This article has shown that the rationale for delegation to the Council Secretariat differs in the first 
and second pillar. In the first pillar, it reduces the negotiation costs of co-operation, while in the 
second  pillar  it  was  delegated  additional  responsibilities.  Such difference  in  delegation  can  be 
explained by the sensitive nature of foreign policy and the variation in functionalist demands across 
both  pillars.  Rather  than  delegating  informational,  executive  and  representational  tasks  to  the 
autonomous and resource-rich Commission, the member states have preferred their own secretariat 
in  the  CFSP.  This  article  has  also  shown  that  the  different  rationales  for  delegation  have  a 
subsequent effect on the Council Secretariat's resources and opportunities in the policy cycle. In 
addition  to  its  process  expertise,  it  possesses  content  expertise  in  the  second pillar.  While  the 
Council Secretariat in the first pillar is furthermore only active during the decision-making phase, it 
plays an important role in the agenda-setting and the implementation of the CFSP as well.
What does this imply for the behaviour of the Council Secretariat and the strategies that it  
pursues  in  both  pillars?  Because  the  Council  Secretariat  in  the  first  pillar  takes  an  interest  in 
expanding  its  competences  in  the  decision-making  phase  (it  prefers  the  more  exciting  role  of 
brokerage over minute-writing), its objective is to have the Presidency and the member states make 
more extensive use of its services. They will, however, only ask the Council Secretariat if it upholds 
its impartial reputation and shows that it provides its principals with higher payoffs. There is thus an 
incentive to stay quiet and operate behind the scenes. In the second pillar many of these points 
apply as well during the decision-making phase. The Council Secretariat needs the member states. 
Yet its additional tasks have given it a more ambitious role, which implies that civil servants will  
have to defend their proposals in the working groups, that Special Representatives have to explain 
the EU's position in third countries, and that the High Representative is seen as the face of European  
foreign policy. These tasks cannot be done behind the scenes.
At the time of  writing,  the member states  and the  institutions were busy discussing the 
implementation of  the  Lisbon Treaty.  In  Baroness  Ashton the  member  states  have  appointed a 
former Trade Commissioner, and she has made clear that her office will be physically located in the  
Commission.  It  is  also clear  that  much of the  foreign policy staff  of the Council  Secretariat  – 
including most of DG E, the Policy Unit, EUMS, CPCC and SITCEN – will be transferred to the 
European External Action Service. This is a new sui generis institution, over which member states 
have  full  control  in  terms  of  organization.  The  Secretariat  will  thus  lose  much  of  its  content 
expertise. It will retain some 50 civil servants, who will service the foreign policy working groups 
in a similar fashion as the Secretariat is supporting the first pillar working groups. In this sense, it  
will again become more of a traditional secretariat, focusing on the efficiency of decision-making.
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